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Abstract 
For the least-developed countries and smalI-island states， excluding a standalone pro-
vision for loss and damage in the Paris Agreement constituted a red line， one that 
the negotiating groups refusedωcross. For the developed world-and the United 
States in particular-any possible pathway to liability and compensation伽 ta los-
and-damage pro吋sionmight introduce was an equally bright and impassable red 
line. In the end， negotiators remained steadfast. Both lines remained more or les 
unbreached， and compromise language emerged in the Paris Qutcome.1 This article 
describes the process leading up to the Outcome， the language included in the los-
and-damage pro吋sionand its implications， and identifies questions that remain. In 
particular， the absenc巴 ofa clear funding s位eam，the treatrnent of climate-related 
displacement， and questions regarding compensation for climate impacts are not 
completely resolved. These are， perhaps， the most compelling， confounding， and im-
pactful elements of the loss-and-damage debate出usfar. Based on the conclusion of 
the Paris COP，出eyare likely continue to animate the loss-and-damage discussion for 
the foreseeable future. 
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1 The Paris Outcome describes the COP Decision Text and its Annex， the也百ftP:訂is
Agreement. 
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1 The Multi-Decade Road to Paris-In Brief 
1.1 Underst，αnding Loss and Damage 
Loss-and-damage proposals become more imperative as our multi-decade 
attempts to reduce emissions and suppo此 adaptationcontinue to founder. 
Though the UNFCCC does not identify a settled definition of the compound 
teロn，'negative e百ectsof climate variability and climate change that people 
have not been able to cope with or adapt to' serves as a working definition.2 
Loss-anιdamage proposals attempt to address the impacts of climate change 
that are not avoided or are unavoidable.3 The term concerns the impacts of 
slow-onset events (such as ocean acidification， desertification， and sea-level 
rise) and non-economic los (such as the loss of cultural heritage and dis-
placement)， among other things. Limited funding， technology， or institutional 
capacity may also result in los and damage， asthe harmful impacts are not 
avoided through adaptation efforts that might be available to wealthier， better-
equipped， orbetter insured communities.4 Further， the losses and damages ex-
perienced by the most vulnerable countries constitute significant percentages 
of their GDP and introduce significant setbacks in development.5 Loss and 
damage is， inshort， evidence of the collateral effects of inadequate or failed 
mitigation and the limits of adaptation. 
Central to appeals for a loss-and-damage mechanism is a recognition of 
ethical and legal obligations that such a mechanism would help to advance. 
As 1 have explained elsewhere， los and damage， and particularly its reparative 
function， would asist vulnerable countries to cope with disasters for which 
出eyare least responsible.6 While loss-and-damage provisions regarding risk 
management and risk transfer could address disaster prevention and the need 
for rapid disbursement of funds， the appeals for compensation and reha-
bilitation reflect a strong sense among those most vulnerable that emerging 
2 Se Alex Durand and Saleemul Huq， 'A Simple Guide to the Warsaw Intemational Mech-
anism on Los and Damage，' ICCCAD， <www.icccad.net/wp-content/uploads/20l5/09/ 
A-simple-guide-to・the-Warsaw-Intemational-Mechanism. pdf>. 
3 Foragl巴n巴raldiscusion of di佐rentdefinitions of'los and damage' and the limits of adapta・
tion， se Maxine Burket，‘Los and Damage'， 4 Climate Law 119 (20斗).
4 Ilona Milar， Catherine Gascoigne， and Elizabeth Caldwell， 'Making Good the Los，' in Threat-
ened Island Nations: Legal Implications 01 Rising Se，ω and a Changing Climate， edited by 
Michael B. Gerrard and Gregory Wannier (Cambridge， UK: Cambridge University Pres， 2013)， 
at437・
5 Ibid. 
6 Se Burket， supra note 3; se also Maxine B町 k巴t，'Climate Reparations'， 10 Melboumejour-
nal olIntemational Law 509 (2009). 
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economies and the developed world have a legal and moral obligation to assist 
them in their survival. Arguments regarding ethical obligations flow from their 
disproportionately low current and historical contribution to the crisis. Argu・
ments regarding legal obligations stem from provisions within the Framework 
Convention and follow-on ProtocoF as well as existing intemationallaw prin-
ciples such as polluter-pays and common but di百erentiatedresponsibilities 
and respective capabilities. 
Because of their unique vulnerability to climate change and their limited 
wealth and adaptive capacity， the small-island developing states， inpa此icu-
lar， have been vocal advocates for a strong and coherent loss-and-damage 
mechanism under the Framework Convention.9 The Alliance of Small Island 
States (AOSIS) was the negotiating group to introduce early versions of a los-
and-damage regime about twenty-five years ago. Initialy a proposal seeking 
insurance-related action， the AOS 1 S proposal evolved into a three-pa此mecha-
nism seeking: (i) an insurance component to help vulnerable countries share 
and transfer risk from increasingly severe weather events; (i) a rehabilitation 
and compensatory component to address progressive negative impacts of cli-
mate change for which measurable los and damage is unavoidable， including 
slow-onset events and unprecedented phenomena such as climate司 induced
migration; and， (ii) a risk-managementcomponent to promote risk assessment 
and management， aswell as to facilitate and inform the other components of 
the proposal.lO AOSIS understood the three components to play 'di町erentand 
complementary roles' and they comprised an 'integrated' and 'interdependent 
approach'll to e百ectiveloss-and-damage govemance. 
AOSIS initialy viewed its cals for a loss-and-damage mechanism as a kind 
of adaptation assistance， which adaptation-related funding might sensibly 
7 Ilona Milar et al.， supra no刷，at 438 (citing UN FCCC，机4(8)，Kyoto Pro旬col，a町 (14日.
8 Other guiding principles inc¥ude principles of equity and intergenerational equity and 
international solidarity. Se Aliance of Small Island States， Proposal to the AWG-LCA， 
'Multi-Window Mechanism ωAddress Los and Damage 合omClimate Change Impacts' 
(2∞8) (on制eWl出author).
9 Se Burket，‘Climate Reparations'， supra note 6 (noting that at the‘1992 UN Con6巴rence
on Environment and Development， Smal Island Developing States were reco伊izedas a 
special case for both environment and development. Their 'sma¥l size， limited resourc巴s，
geographic dispersion， and isolation from [international) markets' make them vulnerable 
児 lativeto curent dev巴lopmentmarkers). 
10 Se generaly Burkett， supra note 3， at124; and AOSIS， 'Los and Damage Briefing' (2012) 
( onfile with author). 
11 AOSIS， supra note 8. 
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support.12 Over time， however， the inadequacy of adaptation-in theory and 
in practice-to suppo此 loss-and-damage-relatedimpacts and proposals be-
came clear. Indeed， the de8ire to distinguish 108S and damage definitively f回m
the adaptation regime was a key negotiating issue for the Paris cop and the 
lead-up to it 
1.2 The Warsaw Internati()naLMechanism and the COP 21 Buildup 
AOSIS'S appeals for a loss-and-damage mechanism continued unabated， with 
notable advances made in the last five years. The 2010 Cancun Adaptation 
Framework built on important language in the Bali Action Plan regarding en-
hanced adaptation efforts， including strategies and means to addre8s 1088 and 
damage. Cancun's Decision 1!CP.16 launched the Work Programme on L088 
and Damage， which the Durban COP elaborated. Doha Decision 3/CP.18 wa8 
a significant advance， a8 it recognized the need to build on 'comprehensive 
climate risk management approaches' and called for advanced under8tanding 
of non-economic IOS8 and damage， patterns of migration and displacement， 
and identification and development of approaches to rehabilitationP The 
Doha decision mandated the formation of an institutional arrangement for 
the above. From that mandate， the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM) 
emerged a year later. 
Prior to the WIM， loss and damage had fallen beyond the purview of 
UNFCCC institutions and funding mechani8ms.14 Decision 2!CP.19 laid out 
an approach to developing a loss-and-damage infrastructure. It charged the 
WIM Executive Committee with enhancing knowledge and understanding 
of comprehensive risk-management approaches to address loss and damage; 
strengthening dialogue， coordination， coherence， and synergy among relevant 
stakeholders relative to 108S and damage; and， enhancing action and suppo比
A two-year workplan to implement the WIM'S mandate was approved at the 
COP 20 in 2014; notably， it included an action area on migration， displacement， 
and mobility.15 
To be sure， the WIM was an interim measure. It did not have any long-
term institutional groundingi in other words， it was a mechanism with a lim-
ited period of operation， with the possibility of renewal. Further， it did not 
identi命aclear funding stream. AIso noteworthy， despite e百ortsto have the 
12 Ibid. 
13 See Burkett， supra note 3， at 127目
14 See ibid.， at124・
15 UNFCCC， D巴cision2/CP.20， 'Warsaw Intemational Mechanism for Loss and Damage'， 
FCCC/CP/2014/1O/Ad.2. 
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loss-and-damage provision reflect the 'beyond adaptation' impacts it is meant 
to address， the WIM was not created as a standalone mechanism， but rather as 
a mechanism under the Cancun Adaptation Framework. 
Its proponents nevertheless deemed thewIM a qualified victory. Concems 
regarding the rehabilitation and compensation component of the proposed 
multi-window mechanisms reflected ongoing and strident opposition to the 
possibility that proponents might weave liability for climate impacts into 
the Framework Convention. While the European Union espoused a more 
nuanced approach to loss and damage， remaining open to its exclusion yet 
mindful of i岱 implicationsfor liability， the United States remained ardently 
opposed to the inclusion of loss and damage wholesale.16 These postures 
portended the deep conflicts in the lead-up to the Paris negotiations， par-
ticularly regarding liability and compensationP The United States' position， 
however， grew more nuanced. Like the Warsaw meetings， the Paris meetings 
would see late progress on los and damage， albeit with key components left 
on the cutting room flor. 
2 The Paris Outcome-Article 8 and the Decision Text 
On the road to Paris the most vulnerable nations， inparticular the small幽 island
developing states， identified a handful of issues that the Paris agreement had 
to resolve. Chief among them was inclusion of a standalone loss-and-damage 
mechanism， distinct仕omadaptation.18 Its inclusion served as a 'red line' for 
AOSIS-without which the negotiating group would not accede to an agree-
ment. Liability and compensation were a red line for developed-country 
parties.I9 Fear of unlimited liability resulting from a standalone agreement 
represented one of the thomiest issues negotiators faced， rendering los and 
16 Se Burkett， supra note 3， at 124・
17 Se discusion of nuanced positions regarding compensation and liability. in ibid.， at129・
18 Se， e.g.， Aliance of Small Island States， 'Paris Must Show Global Solidarity to Tackle 
Climate Change'， 29 Nov. 2015， <htp:/aosis.org/paris-must-show-global-solidarity 
-to-tackle-climate-change/>; and Pacific Island Development Forum Secretariat， 
'Suva Declaration on Climate Change'， 4 Sept 2015， <htp:/pacificidf.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/20l3/06/PACIFIC-ISLAND-DEVELOPMENT-FORUM-SUVA-DECLARATION-ON 
-CLIMATE-CHANGE.V2.pdf>. 
19 Se Meinhard Doelle， 'The Paris Agreement: Historic Breakthrough or High Stakes Experi-
ment?'， 6(1-2) Climate Law (2016) (this isue ofthe joumal) (noting that the United States 
and Australia sought to keep los and damage out of the agr官ementaltogether， orat least 
confining it to the narrow WIM manda絶).
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damage among the disputes with the greatest potential to dash hopes for a 
meaningful and binding agreement in Paris.20 
It is di伍cultto over百tatethe degree to which loss and damage remained a 
wedge issue leading up to， and over the course of， the negotiations at Le Bour-
get. Loss-and-damage 'Die-Ins'21 provided a counter-balance to the sometimes 
sympathetic， yet steadfast， rhetoric of the Obama Administration-which 
noted the President's own island roots yet objected to potentiallegal remedies 
and， earlier in the negotiations， related demands to keep temperature increase 
below 1・50C.2 The latter， incidenta11予wouldinversely and positively impact 
the severity of climate-related loss and damage if achieved.23 
The negotiating drafts reflected this schizophrenia.24 Though earlier drafts 
included options to make no reference to loss and damage at a1， during the 
COP 21 negotiations the United States indicated its openness to including it in 
the agreement， clearing a path for its inclusion-as long as it did not expose 
wealthy countries to compensation claims戸 Loss-and-damageadvocates， and 
island negotiators in pa此icular，were mindful of wealthy-country concems re-
garding liability and the need for compromise language to address it戸Article
8 of the draft Paris Agreement and paragraphs 48 to 52 of the accompanying 
Decision text are， together， the product of that compromise. 
20 See， e.g.， John Upton， 'Paris Pact May Hinge on "Loss and Oamage" Oispute'， Cumate 
Central， 11Nov. 2015， at<www.climatecentral.org/news/dispute-threatens-paris-climate 
-agreement-l9666>. As Upton notes， this fe釘 dissipatedas a published draft agreement 
included more conciliatory language， including language that would explicitly limit li-
ability claims山 lderthe Paris Agreement. 
21 Ben Adler， 'Here's why the words“los and damage" are causing such a fus at the Paris 
climate talks'， Grist， 8 Oec. 2015， <http://grist.org/climate司energy/heres-why-the-words
-loss-and-damage-are-causing-such-a-fuss-at-tl1e-paris-climate-ta¥ks/>. 
22 See Tony Ookoupil， 'Climate change reparations: What does the U.S. owe?'， MSNBC， 2 Dec. 
2015， <www.msnbc.com/msnbcfclimate-change-reparations-what-does-the-us-owe-1>. 
23 It ultimately was achieved. S巴eParis Agreement'， a抗.2. Whether or not this is even fea-
sible given the current state of the climate remains unclear. Indeed， if optimally success-
ful. the loss-and-damage mechanism might incite the largest emitters to redouble their 
efo出 onmitigation as weJl as finance-which in combination wil， insmall part， reduce 
the need for more extensive loss-and-damage陀 sponses.
24 See， e.g.， <http:f /unfccc.int/files/bodies/awg/application/pdf/adp2-1O_e_o4sep20l5U900 
_wds.pdf>・
25 See， e.g.， Pilita Clark， 'COP 21: Small island states hopeful of climate damage deal'， Finan-
cial 1古田mes，6 Dec. 2015， <www.ft.comfcms/s!0/69856762-9α9-l1e5-b45d・4812f209飽61
.html#a沼 Z3YlovAzOz>・
26 Lisa Friedman， 'Obama defends climate diplomacy， back aid for islands'， E&E Reporter， 
10巴c.2015， <www.eenews.net/stories/1060028763>. 
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Under the Agreement， the COP， which can enhance and strengthen the 
WIM in order to address the adverse effects of loss and damage， will guide and 
exercise authority over the mechanism. The Decision includes important ad-
ditional clarifying language. Notably， with respect to migration， the Executive 
Committee will establish a task force to 'complement， draw upon the work of 
and involve， as appropriate existing bodies and expert groups . to develop 
recommendations for integrated approaches to avert， minimize and address 
displacement related to the adverse impacts of climate change.'27 This pro-
vision sharply contrasts with earlier drafts of the proposed agreement that 
vacillated， on the one hand， between a more fully articulated proposal for a 
climate-change-displacementfacility， and， on the other， no mention of climate-
related displacement at al. With regard to the contentious issue of liability and 
compensation， the Decision states concisely:‘'Article 8 of the Agreement [which 
is the article on Loss and Damage] does not involve or provide a basis for any 
liability or compensation.'28 This met the needs for negotiators eager to pass a 
consensus agreement. It leaves， however， a number ofkey issues unresolved. 
3 Lingering Questions 
3・1 The Cutting Room FLoor 
The loss-and-damage provisions are notable in that they a伍rmthe parties' 
commitment to loss and damage and recognize adaptation包constraintsand 
the failures of mitigation eforts to date. Further， they are now outside of the 
adaptation in仕astructure，ostensibly allowing for discrete management and 
financial suppo此 Lossand damage requires， however， further elaboration to 
be successful. Among the key details that the Paris Outcome does not resolve is 
the funding for loss and damage， in addition to the displacement and liability 
concems， discussed in greater detail below. 
With regard to funding， article 8 of the Agreement does not include any 
language on how the cop wil fund the cooperative and facilitative actions 
outlined. Further， loss and damage is not included in article 9， which provides 
financial resources to assist developing countrieswith mi tigation and adaptation 
only. Earlier dra氏sincluded this undoubtedly controversial statement of finan-
cialsuppo此 The5 December draft， for example， stil included support through 
a financial mechanism of the Convention in its loss-and-damage article.29 
27 Decision 1!CP.21， para. 50. 
28 Decision 1!CP.21， parヨ・ 52.
29 UNFCCC， Draft decision -!CP・21，‘DraftParis Agreement'， FCCC!ADP!2015!L.6， 5 Dec. 
2015. The 6 November dr百ftalso included similar language. Draft agreement and合aft
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Of course， this w.邸 bracketedlanguage. The draft's artic1e on finance， and the 
related draft decision text， also mentioned the provision of adequate suppo此
for loss and damage， with explicit reference to supporting the development and 
implementation ofloss-and-damage strategies.3o 
Like adaptation， loss and damage will require a redoubled e百ortto buoy the 
institutional advances it has made so far.31 
3・2 The Task Force for Climate Change DispLacement 
In the course of the year leading up to COP 21， climate-related displacement 
was prominent in dra仕texts.Early drafts of the agreement inc1uded a first-
time elaboration of a 'climate change displacement coordination facility' 
under the proposed loss-and-damage provisions. The facility would assist 
with coordinated efforts to address the needs of those displaced by climate-
related extreme events and plan for organized relocation戸 Australiaopposed 
this facility， decrying it as a les effective and les efficient way to advance 
meaningful intemational action vis-aマismigration and displacement. Other 
formidable partiesー inc1udingthe United States， the United Kingdom， and 
France-were open旬 itsinc1usion， which is， perhaps， why it reemerged as a 
clear component of the 10 December dra負agreement.33Ultimately， only a task 
force on c1imate change displacement is left in the Decision.34 
lt also indicates， perhaps， a di百erentkind of compromiseー thistime among 
developed-country parties. It may foreshadow disagreement on optimal global 
management of climate-related migration， displacement， and mobility. If tack-
led in eamest， however， the task force's e町o此smay activate critically impor-
tant work that was already a stated action area for the WIM35 but has been， on 
decision on workstreams 1 and 2 ofthe Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform 
for Enhanced Action， ADP.2015・1Informal Note， Edited Version of 6 November 2015， 
reisued 10 November 2015・
30 UNFCCC， Draft decision -/CP.21， 'Dra負ParisAgreement'， FCCC/ADP/2015/L.6， 5 Dec. 2015・
31 Se， e.g.， Decision I/CP.21， para. 15 (strongly urging significant increase in adaptation 
finance). 
32 Se， e.g.， UNFCCC， Draft decision -/CP.21， 'Draft Paris Agreement'， FCCC/ADP /20l5/L.6， 5 
Dec.2015・
33 01iver Milman， 'UN drops plan to help move climate-changeaffected people'， The Guardian， 
4 Nov. 2015， <www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/0ct/07/un-drops-plan-to-create 
-group-to-relocate-climate-change-affected-people>. 
34 Decision I/CP.21， para. 50. 
35 'Initial two-year workplan of the Executive Committee of the Warsaw Intemational 
Mechanism for Los and Damage'， <http://unfccc.int/adaptation/workstreams/loss_and 
_damage/items/8805.php> (approved by UNFCCC Decision 2/CP.20). 
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balance， advanced further by other UN agencies and NGOS thus far.戸Thereis 
a core coordination role the task force could play. Further， among the many 
issues that the task force could advance-and， perhaps， resolve-are how 
best to organize migration and planned relocation， how to fund the planning 
for， and movement of， individuals and communities， how to generate and dis-
tribute those funds over time， and how to do al of the above in a principled 
37 manner. 
3・3 The Liahility and Compensation Raw-Death or Redux 
Compensation has been wildly contentious since the heated negotiations 
leading up to COP 19 in Warsaw. It was similarly contentious， and potentially 
derailing， atthe Paris COP， asthe most vulnerable states pressed for inclusion 
of loss and damage in出eagreement戸Whilecompensation is just one of the 
three components of the AOSIS loss-and-damage proposal， it has outsized sig-
nificance because of concems that it could lead to developed-country liabil-
ity for the impacts of current and historic emissions. Proponents of loss and 
damage were not uniform in their insistence on compensation. With best-case 
emission scenarios and the extreme-weather events experienced and forecast， 
however， many loss-and-damage proponents have not wished to foreclose 
their options to pursue compensation for unavoidable and uninsurable cli-
mate change impac白戸Yet，as 1 have noted， inorder to advance the inclusion 
of a loss-and-damage provision in the Agreement， the Decision explicitly ex-
cludes liability and compensation claims based on Article 8. 
The final language on liability claims results from earlier-and telling-
iterations on the nature of that exclusion. For example， the 10 December draft 
of the agreement contained an option to include loss and damage but 'in a 
manner出atdoes not involve or provide a basis for liability or compensation 
36 Se Jesica Wentz and Michael Burger，‘Designing a Climate Change Displacement Co・
ordination Facility: Key Isues for COP 21'， Sabin Center for Cumate Change Lαw， at6 
<https:llweb.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites/climate-change/unfccc 
_climate_change_displacement_coordinationjacility.pdf>. 
37 On posible functions of a climate-displacement facility or task force， se Wentz and 
Burger， supra note 36. 
38 J ulie-Ann Richards， 'Paris climate deal needs solidarity on los and damage'， Cumate Change 
NnI母， u Nov. 2015， <www.cl加 atechangenews.com/2015/u/25/p釘 is-climate-deal-neds
-solidarity-on-los-and-damagel>. 
39 Se generaly Maxine B町 'ke此， 'Rehabilitation: A Propo鈍 1for a Climate Compensation 
Mechanism for Small Island States'， 13 Santa ClaraJournal of Intemational Law 81 (2015); 
andUSD， 'S凹nD1紅yof出eParis Climate Change Conference: 29 November-13 December 
2015'， 12(63) Earth Negotiations Bu1letin 1 (2015)， at 43・
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nor prejudice existing rights under intemationallaw'.40 The exclusion is now 
firrnly in the Decision， although absent the language regarding exi凶 ngrights. 
This move and modification may， on balance， signal a win for loss-and-damage 
advocates.41 More than any other element of the Decision， however， this para-
graph begs the question of the Decision's legal significance. The relative weight 
of the Decision， its relationship to the Agreement， and the binding nature of 
the Agreement itself is relevant to a whole host of issues raised during the ne-
gotiations. This was of particular concem for COP 21， as delegates， consistent 
with the Durban mandate， sought to produce a binding agreement in Paris. 
The legally binding nature of the Agreement is discussed elsewhere in this is-
sue of the journal; however， regarding the reach of paragraph 52 of the Deci-
sion， we should recall that a cop decision is not binding unless there is a‘hook' 
in the treaty that gives it legal force.42 There is no identifiable provision in the 
UNFCCC that would lend legal force to the prohibition of claims for compensa-
tion based on Article 8 of the Agreement. 
Further， regardless of the nature of the Decision， many commentators and 
delegates have noted that there are existing avenues for liability and com-
pensation under intemationallaw that paragraph 52 cannot foreclose戸 The
no-harm and polluter-pays principles， for example， are comerstones of inter-
national environmental law， asare prohibitions against， and compensation 
foむtransboundaryharrn.糾 Allof these principles， and others proposed， are 
40 UNFCCC， Draft decision -/CP.21， 'Draft Paris Agreement'， COP 21 agenda item 4 (b)， 10 Dec. 
2015. 
41 IISD， supra note 39， at 43・
42 See Daniel Bodansky， 'Legaly Binding Versus Non-Legaly Binding Instruments: in To-
wardsal中'orkableand Effective Climate Regime， edited by Scot Baret， Carlo Carraro， and 
Jaime de Melo (London: CEPR Pres and Ferdi， 2015). 
43 See， e.g.， Clark， supra note 25 (quotingJames Fletcher of St Lucia): 'We believe we already 
have avenues for liability and compensation under intemationallaw and intemational 
agreements. The discussion going on right now is a discussion among lawyers. How do 
we end up with a text that alays the fear宮ofthe US， the EU and other countries that we 
are creating a mechanism for liability and compensation. And how do you address our 
concem that we do not give up any rights that we presently already have under intema-
tional agreements: Se also， Milar et al.， supra note 4， at 438 (citing relevant provisions in 
the Intemational Law Commission， 'Responsibility of States for Intemationally WrongfuJ 
Acts'， UN ILC， 53d Ses. (201). 
44 See UNFCCC Preamble， FCCC/!NFORMAL/84; se also， Report of the Intemational Law 
Commission， 5erd Session， 'Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm from 
Hazardous Activities， with Commentary'， 201， A/56/1O; Chrisωpher Schwarte and 
Wil Frank， 'The Intemational Law Association's Legal Principles on Climate Change 
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relevant to the circumstances of global climate change戸 Moreover，some de-
veloping-country delegates made their concerns regarding the spirit and text 
of paragraph 52 clear. Nicaragua and Bolivia， in particular， bemoaned the pres-
ence of language attempting to delimit rights to compensation and access to 
'climate justice'.46 This and related issues might reemerge in the near term. 
Based on the above， the ability of parties to pursue liability claims through 
other avenues， or by revisiting the COP 21 Decision， does not appear to be at 
stake. What is at stake is the trust and solidarity-building between negotiating 
blocs that the loss-and-damage compromises may have inaugurated. Article 8 
and related provisions were the product of a hard-fought conciliation between 
the highest emitters and the most vulnerable， with least-developed countries 
and small-island states deferring complete satisfaction with the text for a 
global consensus in Paris. While there is nothing that legally forecloses future 
discussions on liability and compensation， there may be substantial political 
ramifications that can impede follow-on decision-making. 
4 Conclusion 
With C 0 P 21 negotiations well in the rear view， the enormity of the task at hand 
is abundantly clear. The extreme events facing those most exposed and least-
equipped to manage them dwarf the notable successes in Paris. Achieving a 
standalone loss-and-damage provision was one of those successes， tobe sure， 
though it was just a foothold. The future action it enables will determine its 
actual significance. In the meantime， there are housekeeping details and larger 
definitional challenges that the WIM will need to tackle with its broadened 
and weightier mandate-a mandate that came on the heels of noted concern 
with its limited progress on implementation of the two-year workplan.47 The 
and Climate Liability Under Public Intemational Law，' 4 Climate Law 201-216 (2014); and 
DoeUe， supra note 19・
45 For an impassioned argument， se. e.g. Tim Crosland. 'Vulnerable countries wamed: 
Protect your legal rights in a Paris acord'， Climate Change News， 23Oct 2015. <WWW 
.climatechangenews.com/2015/10/23/vulnerable-countries-wamed-protect-your-legal 
-rights-in-a-paris-acord/>. Crosland notes that sucesful climate litigation may no 
longer be elusive， citing to the recent Urgenda and Leghari cases. 
46 IISD， supra note 39， at 12; se aIso Francesco Sindico， 'A Story of 2.0 Texts and the Landing 
of the Paris Agreement' (Working Paper No・3.Strathclyde Centre For Environmental Law 
and Govemance， University of S回 thclydeGlasgow. 2015)， <www.strath.ac.uk/media/ 
faculties/has/law/scelg/WORKING_PAPER_3_-MERGED.pdf>. 
47 IISD. supra note 39. at 43・
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definitional challenges involve the very attribution of an extreme-weather 
event to past anthropogenic emissions，4S a foundational determination for 
loss and damage. 
The small-island states are clear-eyed about the work needed to advance 
loss and damage and the WIM. They also justifiably paused to celebrate the 
fortitude， coupled with diplomacy， t出ha叫tresulted in an '1沿加lIst旬oricagreemen川1t.'叫4
Indeed， moving ahead， the unresolved issues-those that continue to occupy 
the space between the two red lines-will require a similar mix of fortitude 
and diplomacy. 
48 See Friederike Otto， Rachel James， and Myles Allen， 'The science of attributing extrem巴
W巴atherevents and iωpotential contribution to assessing los and damage associated 
with climate change impacts: Environmental Change Institute， <www.eci.ox.ac.uk>; Chris-
tina Huggel， Daithi Stone， Maximilian Auffhammer， and Gerrit Hansen， 'Loss and damage 
attribution: 3 Nature Climate Change 694 (2013)， at696 (noting that despite the level of 
uncertainty in future climatic conditions， a risk-attribution仕ameworkcan suppo此 poli-
cymakers by indicating the relative， up-to-date contribution of risk drivers-including 
climatic ones-to overall risk， which is eventua¥ly the determinant for los and damage). 
49 Alliance of Small Island States，‘Closing Statement Paris Agreement: 12 December 2015， 
<http://aosis.org/closing-statement-paris-agre巴ment/>・
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